Import Upstream version 1.8.5
[hcoop/debian/openafs.git] / src / kauth / kkids.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2000, International Business Machines Corporation and others.
3 * All Rights Reserved.
4 *
5 * This software has been released under the terms of the IBM Public
6 * License. For details, see the LICENSE file in the top-level source
7 * directory or online at http://www.openafs.org/dl/license10.html
8 */
9
10 /*
11 * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
12 */
13
14 /* These two needed for rxgen output to work */
15 #include <afsconfig.h>
16 #include <afs/param.h>
17 #include <afs/stds.h>
18
19 #include <roken.h>
20
21 #ifdef AFS_NT40_ENV
22 #include <afs/fs_utils.h>
23 #else
24 #include <afs/venus.h>
25 #endif
26
27 #include <rx/xdr.h>
28 #include <afs/prs_fs.h>
29 #include <afs/sys_prototypes.h>
30 #include <afs/afs_consts.h>
31
32 #include "kkids.h"
33
34 #define MAXNAME 100
35
36 static int using_child = 0;
37 static FILE *childin, *childout; /* file pointers on pipe to kpwvalid */
38
39 /* this removes symlinks from the tail end of path names.
40 * PRECONDITION: name must be either absolute ('/something') or
41 * explictly relative to current directory ('./something')
42 */
43 static int
44 simplify_name(char *orig_name, char *true_name)
45 {
46 struct stat statbuff;
47
48
49 #ifdef AFS_NT40_ENV
50 if (stat(orig_name, &statbuff) < 0) {
51 *true_name = '\0';
52 return 0;
53 } else {
54 strcpy(true_name, orig_name);
55 return 1;
56 }
57 #else /* !NT40 */
58 {
59 int link_chars_read;
60 char *last_component;
61 if (lstat(orig_name, &statbuff) < 0) {
62 /* if lstat fails, it's possible that it's transient, but
63 * unlikely. Let's hope it isn't, and continue... */
64 *true_name = '\0';
65 return 0;
66 }
67
68 /*
69 * The lstat succeeded. If the given file is a symlink, substitute
70 * the contents of the link for the file name.
71 */
72 if ((statbuff.st_mode & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK) {
73 link_chars_read = readlink(orig_name, true_name, 1024);
74 if (link_chars_read <= 0) {
75 *true_name = '\0';
76 return 0;
77 }
78
79 true_name[link_chars_read++] = '\0';
80
81 /*
82 * If the symlink is an absolute pathname, we're fine. Otherwise, we
83 * have to create a full pathname using the original name and the
84 * relative symlink name. Find the rightmost slash in the original
85 * name (we know there is one) and splice in the symlink contents.
86 */
87 if (true_name[0] != '/') {
88 last_component = (char *)strrchr(orig_name, '/');
89 strcpy(++last_component, true_name);
90 strcpy(true_name, orig_name);
91 }
92 } else
93 strcpy(true_name, orig_name);
94
95 return 1; /* found it */
96 }
97 #endif /* !NT40 */
98 }
99
100
101 /* We find our own location by:
102 * 1. checking for an absolute or relative path name in argv[0]
103 * this is moderately system-dependant: argv[0] is just a convention.
104 * 2. successively checking each component of PATH, and concatenating argv[0]
105 * onto it, then stating the result.
106 * if it exists, it must be us, eh?
107 * NB there may be possible security implications involving
108 * symlinks; I think they are only relevant if the symlink points
109 * directly at kpasswd, not when it points at kpasswd's parent directory.
110 */
111 static int
112 find_me(char *arg, char *parent_dir)
113 {
114 char *bp; /* basename pointer */
115 char *dp; /* dirname pointer */
116 char *pathelt, orig_name[1024], truename[1022];
117
118 #define explicitname(a,b,c) \
119 ( ((a) == '/') || \
120 ( ((a) == '.') && \
121 ( ((b) == '/') || \
122 ( ((b) == '.') && ((c) == '/') ) \
123 ) \
124 ) \
125 )
126
127 if (strlen(arg) > 510) /* just give up */
128 return 0;
129
130 *parent_dir = '\0';
131 truename[0] = '\0';
132
133 if (explicitname(arg[0], arg[1], arg[2])) {
134 strcpy(orig_name, arg);
135 simplify_name(orig_name, truename);
136 } else {
137 bp = (char *)strrchr(arg, '/');
138 if (bp) {
139 orig_name[0] = '.';
140 orig_name[1] = '/';
141 strcpy(orig_name + 2, arg);
142 simplify_name(orig_name, truename);
143 }
144 }
145
146 if (!truename[0]) { /* didn't find it */
147 char path[2046];
148
149 dp = getenv("PATH");
150 if (!dp)
151 return 0;
152 strncpy(path, dp, 2045);
153
154 for (pathelt = strtok(path, ":"); pathelt;
155 pathelt = strtok(NULL, ":")) {
156 strncpy(orig_name, pathelt, 510);
157
158 bp = orig_name + strlen(orig_name);
159 *bp = '/'; /* replace NUL with / */
160 strncpy(bp + 1, arg, 510);
161
162 if (simplify_name(orig_name, truename))
163 break;
164 }
165 }
166 if (!truename[0]) /* didn't find it */
167 return 0; /* give up */
168
169 /* DID FIND IT */
170 /*
171 * Find rightmost slash, if any.
172 */
173 bp = (char *)strrchr(truename, '/');
174 if (bp) {
175 /*
176 * Found it. Designate everything before it as the parent directory,
177 * everything after it as the final component.
178 */
179 strncpy(parent_dir, truename, bp - truename);
180 parent_dir[bp - truename] = 0;
181 } else {
182 /*
183 * No slash appears in the given file name. Set parent_dir to the current
184 * directory, and the last component as the given name.
185 */
186 strcpy(parent_dir, ".");
187 }
188
189 return 1; /* found it */
190 }
191
192 #define SkipLine(str) { while (*str !='\n') str++; str++; }
193
194 /* this function returns TRUE (1) if the file is in AFS, otherwise false (0) */
195 static int
196 InAFS(char *apath)
197 {
198 struct ViceIoctl blob;
199 afs_int32 code;
200 char space[AFS_PIOCTL_MAXSIZE];
201
202 blob.in_size = 0;
203 blob.out_size = AFS_PIOCTL_MAXSIZE;
204 blob.out = space;
205
206 code = pioctl(apath, VIOC_FILE_CELL_NAME, &blob, 1);
207 if (code) {
208 if ((errno == EINVAL) || (errno == ENOENT))
209 return 0;
210 }
211 return 1;
212 }
213
214 struct Acl {
215 int nplus;
216 int nminus;
217 struct AclEntry *pluslist;
218 struct AclEntry *minuslist;
219 };
220
221 struct AclEntry {
222 struct AclEntry *next;
223 char name[MAXNAME];
224 afs_int32 rights;
225 };
226
227 static struct Acl *
228 ParseAcl(char *astr)
229 {
230 int nplus, nminus, i, trights;
231 char tname[MAXNAME];
232 struct AclEntry *first, *last, *tl;
233 struct Acl *ta;
234 sscanf(astr, "%d", &nplus);
235 SkipLine(astr);
236 sscanf(astr, "%d", &nminus);
237 SkipLine(astr);
238
239 ta = malloc(sizeof(struct Acl));
240 ta->nplus = nplus;
241
242 last = 0;
243 first = 0;
244 for (i = 0; i < nplus; i++) {
245 sscanf(astr, "%100s %d", tname, &trights);
246 SkipLine(astr);
247 tl = malloc(sizeof(struct AclEntry));
248 if (!first)
249 first = tl;
250 strcpy(tl->name, tname);
251 tl->rights = trights;
252 tl->next = 0;
253 if (last)
254 last->next = tl;
255 last = tl;
256 }
257 ta->pluslist = first;
258
259 return ta;
260 }
261
262 static char *
263 safestrtok(char *str, char *tok)
264 {
265 char *temp;
266
267 if (str)
268 return (strtok(str, tok));
269
270 temp = strtok(NULL, tok);
271 if (temp)
272 *(temp - 1) = *tok;
273
274 return temp;
275
276 }
277
278
279 /* If it exists, we do some fussing about whether or not this
280 * is a reasonably secure path - not that it makes *much* difference, since
281 * there's not much point in being more secure than the kpasswd executable.
282 */
283 /* 1. is this directory in AFS?
284 * 2. Is every component of the pathname secure
285 * (ie, only system:administrators have w or a rights)?
286 */
287 static int
288 is_secure(char *dir)
289 {
290 char *temp;
291 struct ViceIoctl blob;
292 struct AclEntry *te;
293 char space[2046];
294 afs_int32 code;
295 struct Acl *ta;
296
297 if (!InAFS(dir)) /* final component *must* be in AFS */
298 return 0;
299
300 #ifndef INSECURE
301 for (temp = safestrtok(dir, "/"); temp; temp = safestrtok(NULL, "/")) {
302 /* strtok keeps sticking NUL in place of /, so we can look at
303 * ever-longer chunks of the path.
304 */
305 if (!InAFS(dir))
306 continue;
307
308 blob.out_size = AFS_PIOCTL_MAXSIZE;
309 blob.in_size = 0;
310 blob.out = space;
311 code = pioctl(dir, VIOCGETAL, &blob, 1);
312 if (code) {
313 continue;
314 }
315 ta = ParseAcl(space);
316 if (ta->nplus <= 0)
317 continue;
318
319 for (te = ta->pluslist; te; te = te->next) {
320 if (((te->rights & PRSFS_INSERT) && (te->rights & PRSFS_DELETE))
321 || (te->rights & (PRSFS_WRITE | PRSFS_ADMINISTER)))
322 if (strcmp(te->name, "system:administrators"))
323 return 0; /* somebody who we can't trust has got power */
324 }
325 }
326 #endif /* INSECURE */
327
328 return 1;
329 }
330
331 /* Then, once we've found our own location, we look for a program named
332 * kpwvalid.
333 */
334
335 /* look for a password-checking program named kpwvalid.
336 * It has to be in a secure place (same place as this executable)
337 */
338 static int
339 kpwvalid_is(char *dir)
340 {
341 struct stat statbuff;
342 int len;
343
344 len = (int)strlen(dir);
345 strcpy(dir + len, "/kpwvalid");
346
347 if (stat(dir, &statbuff) < 0) {
348 /* if lstat fails, it's possible that it's transient, but
349 * unlikely. Let's hope it isn't, and continue... */
350 *(dir + len) = '\0';
351 return 0;
352 }
353
354 *(dir + len) = '\0';
355 return 1;
356 }
357
358 #ifdef AFS_NT40_ENV
359 /* We don't allow the use of kpwvalid executable scripts to set policy
360 * for passwd changes.
361 */
362 int
363 init_child(char *myname)
364 {
365
366 using_child = 0;
367 return using_child;
368
369 }
370 #else /* !NT40 */
371 int
372 init_child(char *myname)
373 {
374 int pipe1[2], pipe2[2];
375 pid_t pid;
376 char dirpath[1024];
377 char *argv[2];
378
379 if (!(find_me(myname, dirpath) && is_secure(dirpath)
380 && kpwvalid_is(dirpath))) {
381 using_child = 0;
382 return 0;
383 }
384
385 /* make a couple of pipes, one for the child's stdin, and the other
386 * for the child's stdout. The parent writes to the former, and
387 * reads from the latter, the child reads from the former, and
388 * writes to the latter.
389 */
390 if (pipe(pipe1) || pipe(pipe2)) {
391 using_child = 0;
392 return 0;
393 }
394
395 /* fork a child */
396 pid = fork();
397 if (pid == -1) {
398 using_child = 0;
399 perror("kpasswd: can't fork because ");
400 return (using_child);
401 }
402 if (pid == 0) { /* in child process */
403 /* tie stdin and stdout to these pipes */
404 /* if dup2 doesn't exist everywhere, close and then dup, but make */
405 /* sure that you really get stdin or stdout from the dup. */
406 if ((-1 == dup2(pipe1[0], 0)) || (-1 == dup2(pipe2[1], 1))) {
407 perror("kpasswd: can't exec kpwvalid because ");
408 exit(-1);
409 }
410
411 strcat(dirpath, "/kpwvalid");
412 argv[1] = NULL;
413 argv[0] = dirpath;
414 execv(dirpath, argv);
415 return 0;
416 } else {
417 using_child = pid; /* save it for later */
418 childin = fdopen(pipe1[1], "w");
419 childout = fdopen(pipe2[0], "r");
420 return (using_child);
421 }
422 }
423 #endif /* not NT40 */
424
425 int
426 password_bad(char *pw)
427 {
428 int rc;
429 rc = 0;
430
431 if (using_child) {
432 fprintf(childin, "%s\n", pw);
433 fflush(childin);
434 if (fscanf(childout, "%d", &rc) < 1)
435 rc = -1;
436 }
437
438 return (rc);
439 }
440
441 /* this is originally only used to give the child the old password, so she
442 * can compare putative new passwords against it.
443 */
444 int
445 give_to_child(char *pw)
446 {
447 int rc;
448 rc = 0;
449
450 if (using_child) {
451 fprintf(childin, "%s\n", pw);
452 fflush(childin);
453 }
454
455 return (rc);
456 }
457
458 /* quickly and painlessly
459 */
460 int
461 terminate_child(void)
462 {
463 int rc;
464 rc = 0;
465
466 #ifndef AFS_NT40_ENV
467 if (using_child) {
468 rc = kill(using_child, SIGKILL);
469 }
470 #endif
471 return (rc);
472 }