More tweaks of skeleton documentation wrt \n behavior at bol/eol.

[bpt/emacs.git] / lisp / net / network-stream.el

diff --git a/lisp/net/network-stream.el b/lisp/net/network-stream.el
index fd21997..28e9d0c 100644 (file)
--- a/lisp/net/network-stream.el
+++ b/lisp/net/network-stream.el
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ;;; network-stream.el --- open network processes, possibly with encryption
 
-;; Copyright (C) 2010-2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+;; Copyright (C) 2010-2014 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
 
 ;; Author: Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen <larsi@gnus.org>
 ;; Keywords: network
@@ -128,6 +128,9 @@ values:
 :use-starttls-if-possible is a boolean that says to do opportunistic
 STARTTLS upgrades even if Emacs doesn't have built-in TLS functionality.
 
+:nogreeting is a boolean that can be used to inhibit waiting for
+a greeting from the server.
+
 :nowait is a boolean that says the connection should be made
   asynchronously, if possible."
   (unless (featurep 'make-network-process)
@@ -211,7 +214,8 @@ STARTTLS upgrades even if Emacs doesn't have built-in TLS functionality.
         ;; Return (STREAM GREETING CAPABILITIES RESULTING-TYPE)
         (stream (make-network-process :name name :buffer buffer
                                       :host host :service service))
-        (greeting (network-stream-get-response stream start eoc))
+        (greeting (and (not (plist-get parameters :nogreeting))
+                       (network-stream-get-response stream start eoc)))
         (capabilities (network-stream-command stream capability-command
                                               eo-capa))
         (resulting-type 'plain)
@@ -238,7 +242,8 @@ STARTTLS upgrades even if Emacs doesn't have built-in TLS functionality.
        (delete-process stream)
        (setq start (with-current-buffer buffer (point-max)))
        (let* ((starttls-extra-arguments
-               (if require-tls
+               (if (or require-tls
+                       (member "--insecure" starttls-extra-arguments))
                    starttls-extra-arguments
                  ;; For opportunistic TLS upgrades, we don't really
                  ;; care about the identity of the peer.