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1 | |
2 | ### acl/30_exim4-config_check_rcpt |
3 | ################################# |
4 | |
5 | # This access control list is used for every RCPT command in an incoming |
6 | # SMTP message. The tests are run in order until the address is either |
7 | # accepted or denied. |
8 | # |
9 | acl_check_rcpt: |
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10 | |
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11 | # Accept if the source is local SMTP (i.e. not over TCP/IP). We do this by |
12 | # testing for an empty sending host field. |
13 | accept |
14 | hosts = : |
15 | |
16 | |
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17 | # The following section of the ACL is concerned with local parts that contain |
18 | # certain non-alphanumeric characters. Dots in unusual places are |
19 | # handled by this ACL as well. |
20 | # |
21 | # Non-alphanumeric characters other than dots are rarely found in genuine |
22 | # local parts, but are often tried by people looking to circumvent |
23 | # relaying restrictions. Therefore, although they are valid in local |
24 | # parts, these rules disallow certain non-alphanumeric characters, as |
25 | # a precaution. |
26 | # |
27 | # Empty components (two dots in a row) are not valid in RFC 2822, but Exim |
28 | # allows them because they have been encountered. (Consider local parts |
29 | # constructed as "firstinitial.secondinitial.familyname" when applied to |
30 | # a name without a second initial.) However, a local part starting |
31 | # with a dot or containing /../ can cause trouble if it is used as part of a |
32 | # file name (e.g. for a mailing list). This is also true for local parts that |
33 | # contain slashes. A pipe symbol can also be troublesome if the local part is |
34 | # incorporated unthinkingly into a shell command line. |
35 | # |
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36 | # These ACL components will block recipient addresses that are valid |
37 | # from an RFC2822 point of view. We chose to have them blocked by |
38 | # default for security reasons. |
39 | # |
40 | # If you feel that your site should have less strict recipient |
41 | # checking, please feel free to change the default values of the macros |
42 | # defined in main/01_exim4-config_listmacrosdefs or override them from a |
43 | # local configuration file. |
44 | # |
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45 | # Two different rules are used. The first one has a quite strict |
46 | # default, and is applied to messages that are addressed to one of the |
47 | # local domains handled by this host. |
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48 | |
49 | # The default value of CHECK_RCPT_LOCAL_LOCALPARTS is defined in |
50 | # main/01_exim4-config_listmacrosdefs: |
51 | # CHECK_RCPT_LOCAL_LOCALPARTS = ^[.] : ^.*[@%!/|`#&?] |
52 | # This blocks local parts that begin with a dot or contain a quite |
53 | # broad range of non-alphanumeric characters. |
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54 | .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_LOCAL_LOCALPARTS |
55 | deny |
56 | domains = +local_domains |
57 | local_parts = CHECK_RCPT_LOCAL_LOCALPARTS |
58 | message = restricted characters in address |
59 | .endif |
60 | |
61 | |
62 | # The second rule applies to all other domains, and its default is |
63 | # considerably less strict. |
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64 | |
65 | # The default value of CHECK_RCPT_REMOTE_LOCALPARTS is defined in |
66 | # main/01_exim4-config_listmacrosdefs: |
67 | # CHECK_RCPT_REMOTE_LOCALPARTS = ^[./|] : ^.*[@%!`#&?] : ^.*/\\.\\./ |
68 | |
69 | # It allows local users to send outgoing messages to sites |
70 | # that use slashes and vertical bars in their local parts. It blocks |
71 | # local parts that begin with a dot, slash, or vertical bar, but allows |
72 | # these characters within the local part. However, the sequence /../ is |
73 | # barred. The use of some other non-alphanumeric characters is blocked. |
74 | # Single quotes might probably be dangerous as well, but they're |
75 | # allowed by the default regexps to avoid rejecting mails to Ireland. |
76 | # The motivation here is to prevent local users (or local users' malware) |
77 | # from mounting certain kinds of attack on remote sites. |
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78 | .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_REMOTE_LOCALPARTS |
79 | deny |
80 | domains = !+local_domains |
81 | local_parts = CHECK_RCPT_REMOTE_LOCALPARTS |
82 | message = restricted characters in address |
83 | .endif |
84 | |
85 | |
86 | # Accept mail to postmaster in any local domain, regardless of the source, |
87 | # and without verifying the sender. |
88 | # |
89 | accept |
90 | .ifndef CHECK_RCPT_POSTMASTER |
91 | local_parts = postmaster |
92 | .else |
93 | local_parts = CHECK_RCPT_POSTMASTER |
94 | .endif |
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95 | domains = +local_domains : +relay_to_domains |
96 | |
97 | |
98 | # Deny unless the sender address can be verified. |
99 | # |
100 | # This is disabled by default so that DNSless systems don't break. If |
101 | # your system can do DNS lookups without delay or cost, you might want |
102 | # to enable this feature. |
103 | # |
104 | # This feature does not work in smarthost and satellite setups as |
105 | # with these setups all domains pass verification. See spec.txt chapter |
106 | # 39.31 with the added information that a smarthost/satellite setup |
107 | # routes all non-local e-mail to the smarthost. |
108 | .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_VERIFY_SENDER |
109 | deny |
110 | message = Sender verification failed |
111 | !acl = acl_whitelist_local_deny |
112 | !verify = sender |
113 | .endif |
114 | |
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115 | # hcoop-change: Add recommended lines from |
116 | # /usr/share/doc/mailman/README.EXIM.gz so that bounce messages |
117 | # get through, even if they are from a malformed address |
118 | |
119 | # Accept bounces to lists even if callbacks or other checks would fail |
120 | warn |
121 | message = X-WhitelistedRCPT-nohdrfromcallback: Yes |
122 | condition = ${if and {{match{$local_part}{(.*)-bounces\+.*}} \ |
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123 | {def:domain} \ |
124 | {eq {${lookup{$local_part}lsearch{MAILMAN_DB}}} \ |
125 | {$domain}}} \ |
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126 | {yes}{no}} |
127 | |
128 | accept |
129 | condition = ${if and {{match{$local_part}{(.*)-bounces\+.*}} \ |
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130 | {def:domain} \ |
131 | {eq {${lookup{$local_part}lsearch{MAILMAN_DB}}} \ |
132 | {$domain}}} \ |
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133 | {yes}{no}} |
134 | |
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135 | # Verify senders listed in local_sender_callout with a callout. |
136 | # |
137 | # In smarthost and satellite setups, this causes the callout to be |
138 | # done to the smarthost. Verification will thus only be reliable if the |
139 | # smarthost does reject illegal addresses in the SMTP dialog. |
140 | deny |
141 | !acl = acl_whitelist_local_deny |
142 | senders = ${if exists{CONFDIR/local_sender_callout}\ |
143 | {CONFDIR/local_sender_callout}\ |
144 | {}} |
145 | !verify = sender/callout |
146 | |
147 | |
148 | # Accept if the message comes from one of the hosts for which we are an |
149 | # outgoing relay. It is assumed that such hosts are most likely to be MUAs, |
150 | # so we set control=submission to make Exim treat the message as a |
151 | # submission. It will fix up various errors in the message, for example, the |
152 | # lack of a Date: header line. If you are actually relaying out out from |
153 | # MTAs, you may want to disable this. If you are handling both relaying from |
154 | # MTAs and submissions from MUAs you should probably split them into two |
155 | # lists, and handle them differently. |
156 | |
157 | # Recipient verification is omitted here, because in many cases the clients |
158 | # are dumb MUAs that don't cope well with SMTP error responses. If you are |
159 | # actually relaying out from MTAs, you should probably add recipient |
160 | # verification here. |
161 | |
162 | # Note that, by putting this test before any DNS black list checks, you will |
163 | # always accept from these hosts, even if they end up on a black list. The |
164 | # assumption is that they are your friends, and if they get onto black |
165 | # list, it is a mistake. |
166 | accept |
167 | hosts = +relay_from_hosts |
168 | control = submission/sender_retain |
169 | |
170 | |
171 | # Accept if the message arrived over an authenticated connection, from |
172 | # any host. Again, these messages are usually from MUAs, so recipient |
173 | # verification is omitted, and submission mode is set. And again, we do this |
174 | # check before any black list tests. |
175 | accept |
176 | authenticated = * |
177 | control = submission/sender_retain |
178 | |
179 | |
180 | # Insist that any other recipient address that we accept is either in one of |
181 | # our local domains, or is in a domain for which we explicitly allow |
182 | # relaying. Any other domain is rejected as being unacceptable for relaying. |
183 | require |
184 | message = relay not permitted |
185 | domains = +local_domains : +relay_to_domains |
186 | |
187 | |
188 | # We also require all accepted addresses to be verifiable. This check will |
189 | # do local part verification for local domains, but only check the domain |
190 | # for remote domains. |
191 | require |
192 | verify = recipient |
193 | |
194 | |
195 | # Verify recipients listed in local_rcpt_callout with a callout. |
196 | # This is especially handy for forwarding MX hosts (secondary MX or |
197 | # mail hubs) of domains that receive a lot of spam to non-existent |
198 | # addresses. The only way to check local parts for remote relay |
199 | # domains is to use a callout (add /callout), but please read the |
200 | # documentation about callouts before doing this. |
201 | deny |
202 | !acl = acl_whitelist_local_deny |
203 | recipients = ${if exists{CONFDIR/local_rcpt_callout}\ |
204 | {CONFDIR/local_rcpt_callout}\ |
205 | {}} |
206 | !verify = recipient/callout |
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207 | |
208 | |
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209 | # CONFDIR/local_sender_blacklist holds a list of envelope senders that |
210 | # should have their access denied to the local host. Incoming messages |
211 | # with one of these senders are rejected at RCPT time. |
212 | # |
213 | # The explicit white lists are honored as well as negative items in |
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214 | # the black list. See exim4-config_files(5) for details. |
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215 | deny |
216 | message = sender envelope address $sender_address is locally blacklisted here. If you think this is wrong, get in touch with postmaster |
217 | !acl = acl_whitelist_local_deny |
218 | senders = ${if exists{CONFDIR/local_sender_blacklist}\ |
219 | {CONFDIR/local_sender_blacklist}\ |
220 | {}} |
221 | |
222 | |
223 | # deny bad sites (IP address) |
224 | # CONFDIR/local_host_blacklist holds a list of host names, IP addresses |
225 | # and networks (CIDR notation) that should have their access denied to |
226 | # The local host. Messages coming in from a listed host will have all |
227 | # RCPT statements rejected. |
228 | # |
229 | # The explicit white lists are honored as well as negative items in |
230 | # the black list. See /usr/share/doc/exim4-config/default_acl for details. |
231 | deny |
232 | message = sender IP address $sender_host_address is locally blacklisted here. If you think this is wrong, get in touch with postmaster |
233 | !acl = acl_whitelist_local_deny |
234 | hosts = ${if exists{CONFDIR/local_host_blacklist}\ |
235 | {CONFDIR/local_host_blacklist}\ |
236 | {}} |
237 | |
238 | |
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239 | # Warn if the sender host does not have valid reverse DNS. |
240 | # |
241 | # If your system can do DNS lookups without delay or cost, you might want |
242 | # to enable this. |
243 | # If sender_host_address is defined, it's a remote call. If |
244 | # sender_host_name is not defined, then reverse lookup failed. Use |
245 | # this instead of !verify = reverse_host_lookup to catch deferrals |
246 | # as well as outright failures. |
247 | .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_REVERSE_DNS |
248 | warn |
249 | message = X-Host-Lookup-Failed: Reverse DNS lookup failed for $sender_host_address (${if eq{$host_lookup_failed}{1}{failed}{deferred}}) |
250 | condition = ${if and{{def:sender_host_address}{!def:sender_host_name}}\ |
251 | {yes}{no}} |
252 | .endif |
253 | |
254 | |
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255 | # Use spfquery to perform a pair of SPF checks (for details, see |
256 | # http://www.openspf.org/) |
257 | # |
258 | # This is quite costly in terms of DNS lookups (~6 lookups per mail). Do not |
259 | # enable if that's an issue. Also note that if you enable this, you must |
260 | # install "libmail-spf-query-perl" which provides the spfquery command. |
261 | # Missing libmail-spf-query-perl will trigger the "Unexpected error in |
262 | # SPF check" warning. |
263 | .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_SPF |
264 | deny |
265 | message = [SPF] $sender_host_address is not allowed to send mail from ${if def:sender_address_domain {$sender_address_domain}{$sender_helo_name}}. \ |
266 | Please see http://www.openspf.org/why.html?sender=$sender_address&ip=$sender_host_address |
267 | log_message = SPF check failed. |
268 | condition = ${run{/usr/bin/spfquery --ip \"$sender_host_address\" --mail-from \"$sender_address\" --helo \"$sender_helo_name\"}\ |
269 | {no}{${if eq {$runrc}{1}{yes}{no}}}} |
270 | |
271 | defer |
272 | message = Temporary DNS error while checking SPF record. Try again later. |
273 | condition = ${if eq {$runrc}{5}{yes}{no}} |
274 | |
275 | warn |
276 | message = Received-SPF: ${if eq {$runrc}{0}{pass}{${if eq {$runrc}{2}{softfail}\ |
277 | {${if eq {$runrc}{3}{neutral}{${if eq {$runrc}{4}{unknown}{${if eq {$runrc}{6}{none}{error}}}}}}}}}} |
278 | condition = ${if <={$runrc}{6}{yes}{no}} |
279 | |
280 | warn |
281 | log_message = Unexpected error in SPF check. |
282 | condition = ${if >{$runrc}{6}{yes}{no}} |
283 | |
284 | # Support for best-guess (see http://www.openspf.org/developers-guide.html) |
285 | warn |
286 | message = X-SPF-Guess: ${run{/usr/bin/spfquery --ip \"$sender_host_address\" --mail-from \"$sender_address\" \ --helo \"$sender_helo_name\" --guess true}\ |
287 | {pass}{${if eq {$runrc}{2}{softfail}{${if eq {$runrc}{3}{neutral}{${if eq {$runrc}{4}{unknown}\ |
288 | {${if eq {$runrc}{6}{none}{error}}}}}}}}}} |
289 | condition = ${if <={$runrc}{6}{yes}{no}} |
290 | |
291 | defer |
292 | message = Temporary DNS error while checking SPF record. Try again later. |
293 | condition = ${if eq {$runrc}{5}{yes}{no}} |
294 | .endif |
295 | |
296 | |
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297 | # Check against classic DNS "black" lists (DNSBLs) which list |
298 | # sender IP addresses |
299 | .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_IP_DNSBLS |
300 | warn |
301 | message = X-Warning: $sender_host_address is listed at $dnslist_domain ($dnslist_value: $dnslist_text) |
302 | log_message = $sender_host_address is listed at $dnslist_domain ($dnslist_value: $dnslist_text) |
303 | dnslists = CHECK_RCPT_IP_DNSBLS |
304 | .endif |
305 | |
306 | |
307 | # Check against DNSBLs which list sender domains, with an option to locally |
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308 | # whitelist certain domains that might be blacklisted. |
309 | # |
310 | # Note: If you define CHECK_RCPT_DOMAIN_DNSBLS, you must append |
311 | # "/$sender_address_domain" after each domain. For example: |
312 | # CHECK_RCPT_DOMAIN_DNSBLS = rhsbl.foo.org/$sender_address_domain \ |
313 | # : rhsbl.bar.org/$sender_address_domain |
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314 | .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_DOMAIN_DNSBLS |
315 | warn |
316 | message = X-Warning: $sender_address_domain is listed at $dnslist_domain ($dnslist_value: $dnslist_text) |
317 | log_message = $sender_address_domain is listed at $dnslist_domain ($dnslist_value: $dnslist_text) |
318 | !senders = ${if exists{CONFDIR/local_domain_dnsbl_whitelist}\ |
319 | {CONFDIR/local_domain_dnsbl_whitelist}\ |
320 | {}} |
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321 | dnslists = CHECK_RCPT_DOMAIN_DNSBLS |
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322 | .endif |
323 | |
324 | |
325 | # This hook allows you to hook in your own ACLs without having to |
326 | # modify this file. If you do it like we suggest, you'll end up with |
327 | # a small performance penalty since there is an additional file being |
328 | # accessed. This doesn't happen if you leave the macro unset. |
329 | .ifdef CHECK_RCPT_LOCAL_ACL_FILE |
330 | .include CHECK_RCPT_LOCAL_ACL_FILE |
331 | .endif |
332 | |
333 | |
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334 | ############################################################################# |
335 | # This check is commented out because it is recognized that not every |
336 | # sysadmin will want to do it. If you enable it, the check performs |
337 | # Client SMTP Authorization (csa) checks on the sending host. These checks |
338 | # do DNS lookups for SRV records. The CSA proposal is currently (May 2005) |
339 | # an Internet draft. You can, of course, add additional conditions to this |
340 | # ACL statement to restrict the CSA checks to certain hosts only. |
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341 | # |
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342 | # require verify = csa |
343 | ############################################################################# |
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344 | |
345 | |
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346 | # Accept if the address is in a domain for which we are an incoming relay, |
347 | # but again, only if the recipient can be verified. |
348 | |
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349 | accept |
350 | domains = +relay_to_domains |
351 | endpass |
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352 | verify = recipient |
353 | |
354 | |
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355 | # At this point, the address has passed all the checks that have been |
356 | # configured, so we accept it unconditionally. |
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357 | |
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358 | accept |