Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
2ea97746 CE |
1 | /* |
2 | * Author: Viktor Dukhovni | |
3 | * License: THIS CODE IS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. | |
4 | * | |
5 | * Copyright (c) The Exim Maintainers 2014 - 2018 | |
6 | */ | |
7 | #include <stdio.h> | |
8 | #include <string.h> | |
9 | #include <stdint.h> | |
10 | ||
11 | #include <openssl/opensslv.h> | |
12 | #include <openssl/err.h> | |
13 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> | |
14 | #include <openssl/safestack.h> | |
15 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | |
16 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
17 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
18 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
19 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | |
20 | ||
21 | #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000000fL | |
22 | # error "OpenSSL 1.0.0 or higher required" | |
23 | #endif | |
24 | ||
25 | #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) | |
26 | # define X509_up_ref(x) CRYPTO_add(&((x)->references), 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509) | |
27 | #endif | |
28 | #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) | |
29 | # define EXIM_HAVE_ASN1_MACROS | |
30 | # define EXIM_OPAQUE_X509 | |
31 | #else | |
32 | # define X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(ctx) (ctx)->verify | |
33 | # define X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(ctx) (ctx)->verify_cb | |
34 | # define X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(ctx) (ctx)->cert | |
35 | # define X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) (ctx)->chain | |
36 | # define X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(ctx) (ctx)->untrusted | |
37 | ||
38 | # define X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_chain) (ctx)->verify = (verify_chain) | |
39 | # define X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(ctx, sk) (ctx)->chain = (sk) | |
40 | # define X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(ctx, val) (ctx)->error_depth = (val) | |
41 | # define X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(ctx, cert) (ctx)->current_cert = (cert) | |
42 | ||
43 | # define ASN1_STRING_get0_data ASN1_STRING_data | |
44 | # define X509_getm_notBefore X509_get_notBefore | |
45 | # define X509_getm_notAfter X509_get_notAfter | |
46 | ||
47 | # define CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT 0 | |
48 | # define CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once run_once | |
49 | typedef int CRYPTO_ONCE; | |
50 | #endif | |
51 | ||
52 | ||
53 | #include "danessl.h" | |
54 | ||
55 | #define DANESSL_F_ADD_SKID 100 | |
56 | #define DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA 101 | |
57 | #define DANESSL_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY 102 | |
58 | #define DANESSL_F_CTX_INIT 103 | |
59 | #define DANESSL_F_GROW_CHAIN 104 | |
60 | #define DANESSL_F_INIT 105 | |
61 | #define DANESSL_F_LIBRARY_INIT 106 | |
62 | #define DANESSL_F_LIST_ALLOC 107 | |
63 | #define DANESSL_F_MATCH 108 | |
64 | #define DANESSL_F_PUSH_EXT 109 | |
65 | #define DANESSL_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR 110 | |
66 | #define DANESSL_F_VERIFY_CERT 111 | |
67 | #define DANESSL_F_WRAP_CERT 112 | |
68 | #define DANESSL_F_DANESSL_VERIFY_CHAIN 113 | |
69 | ||
70 | #define DANESSL_R_BAD_CERT 100 | |
71 | #define DANESSL_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY 101 | |
72 | #define DANESSL_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH 102 | |
73 | #define DANESSL_R_BAD_DIGEST 103 | |
74 | #define DANESSL_R_BAD_NULL_DATA 104 | |
75 | #define DANESSL_R_BAD_PKEY 105 | |
76 | #define DANESSL_R_BAD_SELECTOR 106 | |
77 | #define DANESSL_R_BAD_USAGE 107 | |
78 | #define DANESSL_R_INIT 108 | |
79 | #define DANESSL_R_LIBRARY_INIT 109 | |
80 | #define DANESSL_R_NOSIGN_KEY 110 | |
81 | #define DANESSL_R_SCTX_INIT 111 | |
82 | #define DANESSL_R_SUPPORT 112 | |
83 | ||
84 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR | |
85 | #define DANESSL_F_PLACEHOLDER 0 /* FIRST! Value TBD */ | |
86 | static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_functs[] = { | |
87 | /* error string */ | |
88 | {DANESSL_F_PLACEHOLDER, "DANE library"}, /* FIRST!!! */ | |
89 | {DANESSL_F_ADD_SKID, "add_skid"}, | |
90 | {DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, "DANESSL_add_tlsa"}, | |
91 | {DANESSL_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY, "check_end_entity"}, | |
92 | {DANESSL_F_CTX_INIT, "DANESSL_CTX_init"}, | |
93 | {DANESSL_F_GROW_CHAIN, "grow_chain"}, | |
94 | {DANESSL_F_INIT, "DANESSL_init"}, | |
95 | {DANESSL_F_LIBRARY_INIT, "DANESSL_library_init"}, | |
96 | {DANESSL_F_LIST_ALLOC, "list_alloc"}, | |
97 | {DANESSL_F_MATCH, "match"}, | |
98 | {DANESSL_F_PUSH_EXT, "push_ext"}, | |
99 | {DANESSL_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, "set_trust_anchor"}, | |
100 | {DANESSL_F_VERIFY_CERT, "verify_cert"}, | |
101 | {DANESSL_F_WRAP_CERT, "wrap_cert"}, | |
102 | {0, NULL} | |
103 | }; | |
104 | static ERR_STRING_DATA dane_str_reasons[] = { | |
105 | /* error string */ | |
106 | {DANESSL_R_BAD_CERT, "Bad TLSA record certificate"}, | |
107 | {DANESSL_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY, "Bad TLSA record certificate public key"}, | |
108 | {DANESSL_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH, "Bad TLSA record digest length"}, | |
109 | {DANESSL_R_BAD_DIGEST, "Bad TLSA record digest"}, | |
110 | {DANESSL_R_BAD_NULL_DATA, "Bad TLSA record null data"}, | |
111 | {DANESSL_R_BAD_PKEY, "Bad TLSA record public key"}, | |
112 | {DANESSL_R_BAD_SELECTOR, "Bad TLSA record selector"}, | |
113 | {DANESSL_R_BAD_USAGE, "Bad TLSA record usage"}, | |
114 | {DANESSL_R_INIT, "DANESSL_init() required"}, | |
115 | {DANESSL_R_LIBRARY_INIT, "DANESSL_library_init() required"}, | |
116 | {DANESSL_R_NOSIGN_KEY, "Certificate usage 2 requires EC support"}, | |
117 | {DANESSL_R_SCTX_INIT, "DANESSL_CTX_init() required"}, | |
118 | {DANESSL_R_SUPPORT, "DANE library features not supported"}, | |
119 | {0, NULL} | |
120 | }; | |
121 | #endif | |
122 | ||
123 | #define DANEerr(f, r) ERR_PUT_error(err_lib_dane, (f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__) | |
124 | ||
125 | static int err_lib_dane = -1; | |
126 | static int dane_idx = -1; | |
127 | ||
128 | #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN /* OpenSSL >= 1.0.2 */ | |
129 | static int wrap_to_root = 0; | |
130 | #else | |
131 | static int wrap_to_root = 1; | |
132 | #endif | |
133 | ||
134 | static void (*cert_free)(void *) = (void (*)(void *)) X509_free; | |
135 | static void (*pkey_free)(void *) = (void (*)(void *)) EVP_PKEY_free; | |
136 | ||
137 | typedef struct dane_list | |
138 | { | |
139 | struct dane_list *next; | |
140 | void *value; | |
141 | } *dane_list; | |
142 | ||
143 | #define LINSERT(h, e) do { (e)->next = (h); (h) = (e); } while (0) | |
144 | ||
145 | typedef struct dane_host_list | |
146 | { | |
147 | struct dane_host_list *next; | |
148 | char *value; | |
149 | } *dane_host_list; | |
150 | ||
151 | typedef struct dane_data | |
152 | { | |
153 | size_t datalen; | |
154 | unsigned char data[0]; | |
155 | } *dane_data; | |
156 | ||
157 | typedef struct dane_data_list | |
158 | { | |
159 | struct dane_data_list *next; | |
160 | dane_data value; | |
161 | } *dane_data_list; | |
162 | ||
163 | typedef struct dane_mtype | |
164 | { | |
165 | int mdlen; | |
166 | const EVP_MD *md; | |
167 | dane_data_list data; | |
168 | } *dane_mtype; | |
169 | ||
170 | typedef struct dane_mtype_list | |
171 | { | |
172 | struct dane_mtype_list *next; | |
173 | dane_mtype value; | |
174 | } *dane_mtype_list; | |
175 | ||
176 | typedef struct dane_selector | |
177 | { | |
178 | uint8_t selector; | |
179 | dane_mtype_list mtype; | |
180 | } *dane_selector; | |
181 | ||
182 | typedef struct dane_selector_list | |
183 | { | |
184 | struct dane_selector_list *next; | |
185 | dane_selector value; | |
186 | } *dane_selector_list; | |
187 | ||
188 | typedef struct dane_pkey_list | |
189 | { | |
190 | struct dane_pkey_list *next; | |
191 | EVP_PKEY *value; | |
192 | } *dane_pkey_list; | |
193 | ||
194 | typedef struct dane_cert_list | |
195 | { | |
196 | struct dane_cert_list *next; | |
197 | X509 *value; | |
198 | } *dane_cert_list; | |
199 | ||
200 | typedef struct ssl_dane | |
201 | { | |
202 | int (*verify)(X509_STORE_CTX *); | |
203 | STACK_OF(X509) *roots; | |
204 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain; | |
205 | X509 *match; /* Matched cert */ | |
206 | const char *thost; /* TLSA base domain */ | |
207 | char *mhost; /* Matched peer name */ | |
208 | dane_pkey_list pkeys; | |
209 | dane_cert_list certs; | |
210 | dane_host_list hosts; | |
211 | dane_selector_list selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_LAST + 1]; | |
212 | int depth; | |
213 | int mdpth; /* Depth of matched cert */ | |
214 | int multi; /* Multi-label wildcards? */ | |
215 | int count; /* Number of TLSA records */ | |
216 | } ssl_dane; | |
217 | ||
218 | #ifndef X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH | |
219 | # define X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION | |
220 | #endif | |
221 | ||
222 | ||
223 | ||
224 | static int | |
225 | match(dane_selector_list slist, X509 *cert, int depth) | |
226 | { | |
227 | int matched; | |
228 | ||
229 | /* | |
230 | * Note, set_trust_anchor() needs to know whether the match was for a | |
231 | * pkey digest or a certificate digest. We return MATCHED_PKEY or | |
232 | * MATCHED_CERT accordingly. | |
233 | */ | |
234 | #define MATCHED_CERT (DANESSL_SELECTOR_CERT + 1) | |
235 | #define MATCHED_PKEY (DANESSL_SELECTOR_SPKI + 1) | |
236 | ||
237 | /* | |
238 | * Loop over each selector, mtype, and associated data element looking | |
239 | * for a match. | |
240 | */ | |
241 | for (matched = 0; !matched && slist; slist = slist->next) | |
242 | { | |
243 | dane_mtype_list m; | |
244 | unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
245 | unsigned char *buf = NULL; | |
246 | unsigned char *buf2; | |
247 | unsigned int len = 0; | |
248 | ||
249 | /* | |
250 | * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key. | |
251 | */ | |
252 | switch(slist->value->selector) | |
253 | { | |
254 | case DANESSL_SELECTOR_CERT: | |
255 | len = i2d_X509(cert, NULL); | |
256 | buf2 = buf = US OPENSSL_malloc(len); | |
257 | if(buf) i2d_X509(cert, &buf2); | |
258 | break; | |
259 | case DANESSL_SELECTOR_SPKI: | |
260 | len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), NULL); | |
261 | buf2 = buf = US OPENSSL_malloc(len); | |
262 | if(buf) i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf2); | |
263 | break; | |
264 | } | |
265 | ||
266 | if (!buf) | |
267 | { | |
268 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_MATCH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
269 | return 0; | |
270 | } | |
271 | OPENSSL_assert(buf2 - buf == len); | |
272 | ||
273 | /* | |
274 | * Loop over each mtype and data element | |
275 | */ | |
276 | for (m = slist->value->mtype; !matched && m; m = m->next) | |
277 | { | |
278 | dane_data_list d; | |
279 | unsigned char *cmpbuf = buf; | |
280 | unsigned int cmplen = len; | |
281 | ||
282 | /* | |
283 | * If it is a digest, compute the corresponding digest of the | |
284 | * DER data for comparison, otherwise, use the full object. | |
285 | */ | |
286 | if (m->value->md) | |
287 | { | |
288 | cmpbuf = mdbuf; | |
289 | if (!EVP_Digest(buf, len, cmpbuf, &cmplen, m->value->md, 0)) | |
290 | matched = -1; | |
291 | } | |
292 | for (d = m->value->data; !matched && d; d = d->next) | |
293 | if ( cmplen == d->value->datalen | |
294 | && memcmp(cmpbuf, d->value->data, cmplen) == 0) | |
295 | matched = slist->value->selector + 1; | |
296 | } | |
297 | ||
298 | OPENSSL_free(buf); | |
299 | } | |
300 | ||
301 | return matched; | |
302 | } | |
303 | ||
304 | static int | |
305 | push_ext(X509 *cert, X509_EXTENSION *ext) | |
306 | { | |
307 | if (ext) | |
308 | { | |
309 | if (X509_add_ext(cert, ext, -1)) | |
310 | return 1; | |
311 | X509_EXTENSION_free(ext); | |
312 | } | |
313 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_PUSH_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
314 | return 0; | |
315 | } | |
316 | ||
317 | static int | |
318 | add_ext(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject, int ext_nid, char *ext_val) | |
319 | { | |
320 | X509V3_CTX v3ctx; | |
321 | ||
322 | X509V3_set_ctx(&v3ctx, issuer, subject, 0, 0, 0); | |
323 | return push_ext(subject, X509V3_EXT_conf_nid(0, &v3ctx, ext_nid, ext_val)); | |
324 | } | |
325 | ||
326 | static int | |
327 | set_serial(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid, X509 *subject) | |
328 | { | |
329 | int ret = 0; | |
330 | BIGNUM *bn; | |
331 | ||
332 | if (akid && akid->serial) | |
333 | return (X509_set_serialNumber(cert, akid->serial)); | |
334 | ||
335 | /* | |
336 | * Add one to subject's serial to avoid collisions between TA serial and | |
337 | * serial of signing root. | |
338 | */ | |
339 | if ( (bn = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(X509_get_serialNumber(subject), 0)) != 0 | |
340 | && BN_add_word(bn, 1) | |
341 | && BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, X509_get_serialNumber(cert))) | |
342 | ret = 1; | |
343 | ||
344 | if (bn) | |
345 | BN_free(bn); | |
346 | return ret; | |
347 | } | |
348 | ||
349 | static int | |
350 | add_akid(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) | |
351 | { | |
352 | int nid = NID_authority_key_identifier; | |
353 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING *id; | |
354 | unsigned char c = 0; | |
355 | int ret = 0; | |
356 | ||
357 | /* | |
358 | * 0 will never be our subject keyid from a SHA-1 hash, but it could be | |
359 | * our subject keyid if forced from child's akid. If so, set our | |
360 | * authority keyid to 1. This way we are never self-signed, and thus | |
361 | * exempt from any potential (off by default for now in OpenSSL) | |
362 | * self-signature checks! | |
363 | */ | |
364 | id = akid && akid->keyid ? akid->keyid : 0; | |
365 | if (id && ASN1_STRING_length(id) == 1 && *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(id) == c) | |
366 | c = 1; | |
367 | ||
368 | if ( (akid = AUTHORITY_KEYID_new()) != 0 | |
369 | && (akid->keyid = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) != 0 | |
370 | #ifdef EXIM_HAVE_ASN1_MACROS | |
371 | && ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(akid->keyid, (void *) &c, 1) | |
372 | #else | |
373 | && M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(akid->keyid, (void *) &c, 1) | |
374 | #endif | |
375 | && X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert, nid, akid, 0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND)) | |
376 | ret = 1; | |
377 | if (akid) | |
378 | AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid); | |
379 | return ret; | |
380 | } | |
381 | ||
382 | static int | |
383 | add_skid(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) | |
384 | { | |
385 | int nid = NID_subject_key_identifier; | |
386 | ||
387 | if (!akid || !akid->keyid) | |
388 | return add_ext(0, cert, nid, "hash"); | |
389 | return X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert, nid, akid->keyid, 0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND) > 0; | |
390 | } | |
391 | ||
392 | static X509_NAME * | |
393 | akid_issuer_name(AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) | |
394 | { | |
395 | if (akid && akid->issuer) | |
396 | { | |
397 | int i; | |
398 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens = akid->issuer; | |
399 | ||
400 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); ++i) | |
401 | { | |
402 | GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
403 | ||
404 | if (gn->type == GEN_DIRNAME) | |
405 | return (gn->d.dirn); | |
406 | } | |
407 | } | |
408 | return 0; | |
409 | } | |
410 | ||
411 | static int | |
412 | set_issuer_name(X509 *cert, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid, X509_NAME *subj) | |
413 | { | |
414 | X509_NAME *name = akid_issuer_name(akid); | |
415 | ||
416 | /* | |
417 | * If subject's akid specifies an authority key identifier issuer name, we | |
418 | * must use that. | |
419 | */ | |
420 | return X509_set_issuer_name(cert, | |
421 | name ? name : subj); | |
422 | } | |
423 | ||
424 | static int | |
425 | grow_chain(ssl_dane *dane, int trusted, X509 *cert) | |
426 | { | |
427 | STACK_OF(X509) **xs = trusted ? &dane->roots : &dane->chain; | |
428 | static ASN1_OBJECT *serverAuth = 0; | |
429 | ||
430 | #define UNTRUSTED 0 | |
431 | #define TRUSTED 1 | |
432 | ||
433 | if ( trusted && !serverAuth | |
434 | && !(serverAuth = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_server_auth))) | |
435 | { | |
436 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
437 | return 0; | |
438 | } | |
439 | if (!*xs && !(*xs = sk_X509_new_null())) | |
440 | { | |
441 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
442 | return 0; | |
443 | } | |
444 | ||
445 | if (cert) | |
446 | { | |
447 | if (trusted && !X509_add1_trust_object(cert, serverAuth)) | |
448 | return 0; | |
449 | #ifdef EXIM_OPAQUE_X509 | |
450 | X509_up_ref(cert); | |
451 | #else | |
452 | CRYPTO_add(&cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | |
453 | #endif | |
454 | if (!sk_X509_push(*xs, cert)) | |
455 | { | |
456 | X509_free(cert); | |
457 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_GROW_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
458 | return 0; | |
459 | } | |
460 | } | |
461 | return 1; | |
462 | } | |
463 | ||
464 | static int | |
465 | wrap_issuer(ssl_dane *dane, EVP_PKEY *key, X509 *subject, int depth, int top) | |
466 | { | |
467 | int ret = 1; | |
468 | X509 *cert = 0; | |
469 | AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid; | |
470 | X509_NAME *name = X509_get_issuer_name(subject); | |
471 | EVP_PKEY *newkey = key ? key : X509_get_pubkey(subject); | |
472 | ||
473 | #define WRAP_MID 0 /* Ensure intermediate. */ | |
474 | #define WRAP_TOP 1 /* Ensure self-signed. */ | |
475 | ||
476 | if (!name || !newkey || !(cert = X509_new())) | |
477 | return 0; | |
478 | ||
479 | /* | |
480 | * Record the depth of the trust-anchor certificate. | |
481 | */ | |
482 | if (dane->depth < 0) | |
483 | dane->depth = depth + 1; | |
484 | ||
485 | /* | |
486 | * XXX: Uncaught error condition: | |
487 | * | |
488 | * The return value is NULL both when the extension is missing, and when | |
489 | * OpenSSL rans out of memory while parsing the extension. | |
490 | */ | |
491 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
492 | akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(subject, NID_authority_key_identifier, 0, 0); | |
493 | /* XXX: Should we peek at the error stack here??? */ | |
494 | ||
495 | /* | |
496 | * If top is true generate a self-issued root CA, otherwise an | |
497 | * intermediate CA and possibly its self-signed issuer. | |
498 | * | |
499 | * CA cert valid for +/- 30 days | |
500 | */ | |
501 | if ( !X509_set_version(cert, 2) | |
502 | || !set_serial(cert, akid, subject) | |
503 | || !set_issuer_name(cert, akid, name) | |
504 | || !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(cert), -30 * 86400L) | |
505 | || !X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notAfter(cert), 30 * 86400L) | |
506 | || !X509_set_subject_name(cert, name) | |
507 | || !X509_set_pubkey(cert, newkey) | |
508 | || !add_ext(0, cert, NID_basic_constraints, "CA:TRUE") | |
509 | || (!top && !add_akid(cert, akid)) | |
510 | || !add_skid(cert, akid) | |
511 | || ( !top && wrap_to_root | |
512 | && !wrap_issuer(dane, newkey, cert, depth, WRAP_TOP))) | |
513 | ret = 0; | |
514 | ||
515 | if (akid) | |
516 | AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(akid); | |
517 | if (!key) | |
518 | EVP_PKEY_free(newkey); | |
519 | if (ret) | |
520 | ret = grow_chain(dane, !top && wrap_to_root ? UNTRUSTED : TRUSTED, cert); | |
521 | if (cert) | |
522 | X509_free(cert); | |
523 | return ret; | |
524 | } | |
525 | ||
526 | static int | |
527 | wrap_cert(ssl_dane *dane, X509 *tacert, int depth) | |
528 | { | |
529 | if (dane->depth < 0) | |
530 | dane->depth = depth + 1; | |
531 | ||
532 | /* | |
533 | * If the TA certificate is self-issued, or need not be, use it directly. | |
534 | * Otherwise, synthesize requisite ancestors. | |
535 | */ | |
536 | if ( !wrap_to_root | |
537 | || X509_check_issued(tacert, tacert) == X509_V_OK) | |
538 | return grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, tacert); | |
539 | ||
540 | if (wrap_issuer(dane, 0, tacert, depth, WRAP_MID)) | |
541 | return grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, tacert); | |
542 | return 0; | |
543 | } | |
544 | ||
545 | static int | |
546 | ta_signed(ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert, int depth) | |
547 | { | |
548 | dane_cert_list x; | |
549 | dane_pkey_list k; | |
550 | EVP_PKEY *pk; | |
551 | int done = 0; | |
552 | ||
553 | /* | |
554 | * First check whether issued and signed by a TA cert, this is cheaper | |
555 | * than the bare-public key checks below, since we can determine whether | |
556 | * the candidate TA certificate issued the certificate to be checked | |
557 | * first (name comparisons), before we bother with signature checks | |
558 | * (public key operations). | |
559 | */ | |
560 | for (x = dane->certs; !done && x; x = x->next) | |
561 | { | |
562 | if (X509_check_issued(x->value, cert) == X509_V_OK) | |
563 | { | |
564 | if (!(pk = X509_get_pubkey(x->value))) | |
565 | { | |
566 | /* | |
567 | * The cert originally contained a valid pkey, which does | |
568 | * not just vanish, so this is most likely a memory error. | |
569 | */ | |
570 | done = -1; | |
571 | break; | |
572 | } | |
573 | /* Check signature, since some other TA may work if not this. */ | |
574 | if (X509_verify(cert, pk) > 0) | |
575 | done = wrap_cert(dane, x->value, depth) ? 1 : -1; | |
576 | EVP_PKEY_free(pk); | |
577 | } | |
578 | } | |
579 | ||
580 | /* | |
581 | * With bare TA public keys, we can't check whether the trust chain is | |
582 | * issued by the key, but we can determine whether it is signed by the | |
583 | * key, so we go with that. | |
584 | * | |
585 | * Ideally, the corresponding certificate was presented in the chain, and we | |
586 | * matched it by its public key digest one level up. This code is here | |
587 | * to handle adverse conditions imposed by sloppy administrators of | |
588 | * receiving systems with poorly constructed chains. | |
589 | * | |
590 | * We'd like to optimize out keys that should not match when the cert's | |
591 | * authority key id does not match the key id of this key computed via | |
592 | * the RFC keyid algorithm (SHA-1 digest of public key bit-string sans | |
593 | * ASN1 tag and length thus also excluding the unused bits field that is | |
594 | * logically part of the length). However, some CAs have a non-standard | |
595 | * authority keyid, so we lose. Too bad. | |
596 | * | |
597 | * This may push errors onto the stack when the certificate signature is | |
598 | * not of the right type or length, throw these away, | |
599 | */ | |
600 | for (k = dane->pkeys; !done && k; k = k->next) | |
601 | if (X509_verify(cert, k->value) > 0) | |
602 | done = wrap_issuer(dane, k->value, cert, depth, WRAP_MID) ? 1 : -1; | |
603 | else | |
604 | ERR_clear_error(); | |
605 | ||
606 | return done; | |
607 | } | |
608 | ||
609 | static int | |
610 | set_trust_anchor(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert) | |
611 | { | |
612 | int matched = 0; | |
613 | int n; | |
614 | int i; | |
615 | int depth = 0; | |
616 | EVP_PKEY *takey; | |
617 | X509 *ca; | |
618 | STACK_OF(X509) *in = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(ctx); | |
619 | ||
620 | if (!grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, 0)) | |
621 | return -1; | |
622 | ||
623 | /* | |
624 | * Accept a degenerate case: depth 0 self-signed trust-anchor. | |
625 | */ | |
626 | if (X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK) | |
627 | { | |
628 | dane->depth = 0; | |
629 | matched = match(dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA], cert, 0); | |
630 | if (matched > 0 && !grow_chain(dane, TRUSTED, cert)) | |
631 | matched = -1; | |
632 | return matched; | |
633 | } | |
634 | ||
635 | /* Make a shallow copy of the input untrusted chain. */ | |
636 | if (!(in = sk_X509_dup(in))) | |
637 | { | |
638 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
639 | return -1; | |
640 | } | |
641 | ||
642 | /* | |
643 | * At each iteration we consume the issuer of the current cert. This | |
644 | * reduces the length of the "in" chain by one. If no issuer is found, | |
645 | * we are done. We also stop when a certificate matches a TA in the | |
646 | * peer's TLSA RRset. | |
647 | * | |
648 | * Caller ensures that the initial certificate is not self-signed. | |
649 | */ | |
650 | for (n = sk_X509_num(in); n > 0; --n, ++depth) | |
651 | { | |
652 | for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) | |
653 | if (X509_check_issued(sk_X509_value(in, i), cert) == X509_V_OK) | |
654 | break; | |
655 | ||
656 | /* | |
657 | * Final untrusted element with no issuer in the peer's chain, it may | |
658 | * however be signed by a pkey or cert obtained via a TLSA RR. | |
659 | */ | |
660 | if (i == n) | |
661 | break; | |
662 | ||
663 | /* Peer's chain contains an issuer ca. */ | |
664 | ca = sk_X509_delete(in, i); | |
665 | ||
666 | /* If not a trust anchor, record untrusted ca and continue. */ | |
667 | if ((matched = match(dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA], ca, | |
668 | depth + 1)) == 0) | |
669 | { | |
670 | if (grow_chain(dane, UNTRUSTED, ca)) | |
671 | { | |
672 | if (X509_check_issued(ca, ca) != X509_V_OK) | |
673 | { | |
674 | /* Restart with issuer as subject */ | |
675 | cert = ca; | |
676 | continue; | |
677 | } | |
678 | /* Final self-signed element, skip ta_signed() check. */ | |
679 | cert = 0; | |
680 | } | |
681 | else | |
682 | matched = -1; | |
683 | } | |
684 | else if(matched == MATCHED_CERT) | |
685 | { | |
686 | if(!wrap_cert(dane, ca, depth)) | |
687 | matched = -1; | |
688 | } | |
689 | else if(matched == MATCHED_PKEY) | |
690 | { | |
691 | if ( !(takey = X509_get_pubkey(ca)) | |
692 | || !wrap_issuer(dane, takey, cert, depth, WRAP_MID)) | |
693 | { | |
694 | if (takey) | |
695 | EVP_PKEY_free(takey); | |
696 | else | |
697 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_SET_TRUST_ANCHOR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
698 | matched = -1; | |
699 | } | |
700 | } | |
701 | break; | |
702 | } | |
703 | ||
704 | /* Shallow free the duplicated input untrusted chain. */ | |
705 | sk_X509_free(in); | |
706 | ||
707 | /* | |
708 | * When the loop exits, if "cert" is set, it is not self-signed and has | |
709 | * no issuer in the chain, we check for a possible signature via a DNS | |
710 | * obtained TA cert or public key. | |
711 | */ | |
712 | if (matched == 0 && cert) | |
713 | matched = ta_signed(dane, cert, depth); | |
714 | ||
715 | return matched; | |
716 | } | |
717 | ||
718 | static int | |
719 | check_end_entity(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert) | |
720 | { | |
721 | int matched; | |
722 | ||
723 | matched = match(dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE], cert, 0); | |
724 | if (matched > 0) | |
725 | { | |
726 | dane->mdpth = 0; | |
727 | dane->match = cert; | |
728 | X509_up_ref(cert); | |
729 | if(!X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx)) | |
730 | { | |
731 | STACK_OF(X509) * sk = sk_X509_new_null(); | |
732 | if (sk && sk_X509_push(sk, cert)) | |
733 | { | |
734 | X509_up_ref(cert); | |
735 | X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(ctx, sk); | |
736 | } | |
737 | else | |
738 | { | |
739 | if (sk) sk_X509_free(sk); | |
740 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_CHECK_END_ENTITY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
741 | return -1; | |
742 | } | |
743 | } | |
744 | } | |
745 | return matched; | |
746 | } | |
747 | ||
748 | static int | |
749 | match_name(const char *certid, ssl_dane *dane) | |
750 | { | |
751 | int multi = dane->multi; | |
752 | dane_host_list hosts; | |
753 | ||
754 | for (hosts = dane->hosts; hosts; hosts = hosts->next) | |
755 | { | |
756 | int match_subdomain = 0; | |
757 | const char *domain = hosts->value; | |
758 | const char *parent; | |
759 | int idlen; | |
760 | int domlen; | |
761 | ||
762 | if (*domain == '.' && domain[1] != '\0') | |
763 | { | |
764 | ++domain; | |
765 | match_subdomain = 1; | |
766 | } | |
767 | ||
768 | /* | |
769 | * Sub-domain match: certid is any sub-domain of hostname. | |
770 | */ | |
771 | if(match_subdomain) | |
772 | { | |
773 | if ( (idlen = strlen(certid)) > (domlen = strlen(domain)) + 1 | |
774 | && certid[idlen - domlen - 1] == '.' | |
775 | && !strcasecmp(certid + (idlen - domlen), domain)) | |
776 | return 1; | |
777 | else | |
778 | continue; | |
779 | } | |
780 | ||
781 | /* | |
782 | * Exact match and initial "*" match. The initial "*" in a certid | |
783 | * matches one (if multi is false) or more hostname components under | |
784 | * the condition that the certid contains multiple hostname components. | |
785 | */ | |
786 | if ( !strcasecmp(certid, domain) | |
787 | || ( certid[0] == '*' && certid[1] == '.' && certid[2] != 0 | |
788 | && (parent = strchr(domain, '.')) != 0 | |
789 | && (idlen = strlen(certid + 1)) <= (domlen = strlen(parent)) | |
790 | && strcasecmp(multi ? parent + domlen - idlen : parent, certid+1) == 0)) | |
791 | return 1; | |
792 | } | |
793 | return 0; | |
794 | } | |
795 | ||
796 | static const char * | |
797 | check_name(const char *name, int len) | |
798 | { | |
799 | const char *cp = name + len; | |
800 | ||
801 | while (len > 0 && !*--cp) | |
802 | --len; /* Ignore trailing NULs */ | |
803 | if (len <= 0) | |
804 | return 0; | |
805 | for (cp = name; *cp; cp++) | |
806 | { | |
807 | char c = *cp; | |
808 | if (!((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || | |
809 | (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || | |
810 | (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || | |
811 | (c == '.' || c == '-') || | |
812 | (c == '*'))) | |
813 | return 0; /* Only LDH, '.' and '*' */ | |
814 | } | |
815 | if (cp - name != len) /* Guard against internal NULs */ | |
816 | return 0; | |
817 | return name; | |
818 | } | |
819 | ||
820 | static const char * | |
821 | parse_dns_name(const GENERAL_NAME *gn) | |
822 | { | |
823 | if (gn->type != GEN_DNS) | |
824 | return 0; | |
825 | if (ASN1_STRING_type(gn->d.ia5) != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) | |
826 | return 0; | |
827 | return check_name(CCS ASN1_STRING_get0_data(gn->d.ia5), | |
828 | ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5)); | |
829 | } | |
830 | ||
831 | static char * | |
832 | parse_subject_name(X509 *cert) | |
833 | { | |
834 | X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(cert); | |
835 | X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry; | |
836 | ASN1_STRING *entry_str; | |
837 | unsigned char *namebuf; | |
838 | int nid = NID_commonName; | |
839 | int len; | |
840 | int i; | |
841 | ||
842 | if (!name || (i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, nid, -1)) < 0) | |
843 | return 0; | |
844 | if (!(entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i))) | |
845 | return 0; | |
846 | if (!(entry_str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry))) | |
847 | return 0; | |
848 | ||
849 | if ((len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&namebuf, entry_str)) < 0) | |
850 | return 0; | |
851 | if (len <= 0 || check_name(CS namebuf, len) == 0) | |
852 | { | |
853 | OPENSSL_free(namebuf); | |
854 | return 0; | |
855 | } | |
856 | return CS namebuf; | |
857 | } | |
858 | ||
859 | static int | |
860 | name_check(ssl_dane *dane, X509 *cert) | |
861 | { | |
862 | int matched = 0; | |
863 | BOOL got_altname = FALSE; | |
864 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens; | |
865 | ||
866 | gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, 0, 0); | |
867 | if (gens) | |
868 | { | |
869 | int n = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); | |
870 | int i; | |
871 | ||
872 | for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) | |
873 | { | |
874 | const GENERAL_NAME *gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
875 | const char *certid; | |
876 | ||
877 | if (gn->type != GEN_DNS) | |
878 | continue; | |
879 | got_altname = TRUE; | |
880 | certid = parse_dns_name(gn); | |
881 | if (certid && *certid) | |
882 | { | |
883 | if ((matched = match_name(certid, dane)) == 0) | |
884 | continue; | |
885 | if (!(dane->mhost = OPENSSL_strdup(certid))) | |
886 | matched = -1; | |
887 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane name_check: matched SAN %s\n", certid); | |
888 | break; | |
889 | } | |
890 | } | |
891 | GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens); | |
892 | } | |
893 | ||
894 | /* | |
895 | * XXX: Should the subjectName be skipped when *any* altnames are present, | |
896 | * or only when DNS altnames are present? | |
897 | */ | |
898 | if (!got_altname) | |
899 | { | |
900 | char *certid = parse_subject_name(cert); | |
901 | if (certid != 0 && *certid && (matched = match_name(certid, dane)) != 0) | |
902 | { | |
903 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane name_check: matched SN %s\n", certid); | |
904 | dane->mhost = OPENSSL_strdup(certid); | |
905 | } | |
906 | if (certid) | |
907 | OPENSSL_free(certid); | |
908 | } | |
909 | return matched; | |
910 | } | |
911 | ||
912 | static int | |
913 | verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | |
914 | { | |
915 | int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(ctx); | |
916 | X509 *cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(ctx); | |
917 | STACK_OF(X509) * chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx); | |
918 | int chain_length = sk_X509_num(chain); | |
919 | int ssl_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(); | |
920 | SSL *ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ssl_idx); | |
921 | ssl_dane *dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx); | |
922 | dane_selector_list issuer_rrs = dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_PKIX_TA]; | |
923 | dane_selector_list leaf_rrs = dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_PKIX_EE]; | |
924 | int matched = 0; | |
925 | ||
926 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane verify_chain\n"); | |
927 | ||
928 | /* Restore OpenSSL's internal_verify() as the signature check function */ | |
929 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(ctx, dane->verify); | |
930 | ||
931 | if ((matched = name_check(dane, cert)) < 0) | |
932 | { | |
933 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); | |
934 | return 0; | |
935 | } | |
936 | ||
937 | if (!matched) | |
938 | { | |
939 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(ctx, 0); | |
940 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(ctx, cert); | |
941 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH); | |
942 | if (!cb(0, ctx)) | |
943 | return 0; | |
944 | } | |
945 | matched = 0; | |
946 | ||
947 | /* | |
948 | * Satisfy at least one usage 0 or 1 constraint, unless we've already | |
949 | * matched a usage 2 trust anchor. | |
950 | * | |
951 | * XXX: internal_verify() doesn't callback with top certs that are not | |
952 | * self-issued. This is fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0. | |
953 | */ | |
954 | if (dane->roots && sk_X509_num(dane->roots)) | |
955 | { | |
956 | X509 *top = sk_X509_value(chain, dane->depth); | |
957 | ||
958 | dane->mdpth = dane->depth; | |
959 | dane->match = top; | |
960 | X509_up_ref(top); | |
961 | ||
962 | #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L | |
963 | if (X509_check_issued(top, top) != X509_V_OK) | |
964 | { | |
965 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(ctx, dane->depth); | |
966 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(ctx, top); | |
967 | if (!cb(1, ctx)) | |
968 | return 0; | |
969 | } | |
970 | #endif | |
971 | /* Pop synthetic trust-anchor ancestors off the chain! */ | |
972 | while (--chain_length > dane->depth) | |
973 | X509_free(sk_X509_pop(chain)); | |
974 | } | |
975 | else | |
976 | { | |
977 | int n = 0; | |
978 | X509 *xn = cert; | |
979 | ||
980 | /* | |
981 | * Check for an EE match, then a CA match at depths > 0, and | |
982 | * finally, if the EE cert is self-issued, for a depth 0 CA match. | |
983 | */ | |
984 | if (leaf_rrs) | |
985 | matched = match(leaf_rrs, xn, 0); | |
986 | if (matched) DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane verify_chain: matched EE\n"); | |
987 | ||
988 | if (!matched && issuer_rrs) | |
989 | for (n = chain_length-1; !matched && n >= 0; --n) | |
990 | { | |
991 | xn = sk_X509_value(chain, n); | |
992 | if (n > 0 || X509_check_issued(xn, xn) == X509_V_OK) | |
993 | matched = match(issuer_rrs, xn, n); | |
994 | } | |
995 | if (matched) DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane verify_chain: matched %s\n", | |
996 | n>0 ? "CA" : "selfisssued EE"); | |
997 | ||
998 | if (!matched) | |
999 | { | |
1000 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(ctx, 0); | |
1001 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(ctx, cert); | |
1002 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED); | |
1003 | if (!cb(0, ctx)) | |
1004 | return 0; | |
1005 | } | |
1006 | else | |
1007 | { | |
1008 | dane->mdpth = n; | |
1009 | dane->match = xn; | |
1010 | X509_up_ref(xn); | |
1011 | } | |
1012 | } | |
1013 | ||
1014 | /* Tail recurse into OpenSSL's internal_verify */ | |
1015 | return dane->verify(ctx); | |
1016 | } | |
1017 | ||
1018 | static void | |
1019 | dane_reset(ssl_dane *dane) | |
1020 | { | |
1021 | dane->depth = -1; | |
1022 | if (dane->mhost) | |
1023 | { | |
1024 | OPENSSL_free(dane->mhost); | |
1025 | dane->mhost = 0; | |
1026 | } | |
1027 | if (dane->roots) | |
1028 | { | |
1029 | sk_X509_pop_free(dane->roots, X509_free); | |
1030 | dane->roots = 0; | |
1031 | } | |
1032 | if (dane->chain) | |
1033 | { | |
1034 | sk_X509_pop_free(dane->chain, X509_free); | |
1035 | dane->chain = 0; | |
1036 | } | |
1037 | if (dane->match) | |
1038 | { | |
1039 | X509_free(dane->match); | |
1040 | dane->match = 0; | |
1041 | } | |
1042 | dane->mdpth = -1; | |
1043 | } | |
1044 | ||
1045 | static int | |
1046 | verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *unused_ctx) | |
1047 | { | |
1048 | static int ssl_idx = -1; | |
1049 | SSL *ssl; | |
1050 | ssl_dane *dane; | |
1051 | int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *) = X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(ctx); | |
1052 | X509 *cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(ctx); | |
1053 | int matched; | |
1054 | ||
1055 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane verify_cert\n"); | |
1056 | ||
1057 | if (ssl_idx < 0) | |
1058 | ssl_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(); | |
1059 | if (dane_idx < 0) | |
1060 | { | |
1061 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1062 | return -1; | |
1063 | } | |
1064 | ||
1065 | ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, ssl_idx); | |
1066 | if (!(dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)) || !cert) | |
1067 | return X509_verify_cert(ctx); | |
1068 | ||
1069 | /* Reset for verification of a new chain, perhaps a renegotiation. */ | |
1070 | dane_reset(dane); | |
1071 | ||
1072 | if (dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_EE]) | |
1073 | { | |
1074 | if ((matched = check_end_entity(ctx, dane, cert)) > 0) | |
1075 | { | |
1076 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(ctx, 0); | |
1077 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(ctx, cert); | |
1078 | return cb(1, ctx); | |
1079 | } | |
1080 | if (matched < 0) | |
1081 | { | |
1082 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); | |
1083 | return -1; | |
1084 | } | |
1085 | } | |
1086 | ||
1087 | if (dane->selectors[DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA]) | |
1088 | { | |
1089 | if ((matched = set_trust_anchor(ctx, dane, cert)) < 0) | |
1090 | { | |
1091 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM); | |
1092 | return -1; | |
1093 | } | |
1094 | if (matched) | |
1095 | { | |
1096 | /* | |
1097 | * Check that setting the untrusted chain updates the expected | |
1098 | * structure member at the expected offset. | |
1099 | */ | |
1100 | X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(ctx, dane->roots); | |
1101 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx, dane->chain); | |
1102 | OPENSSL_assert(dane->chain == X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(ctx)); | |
1103 | } | |
1104 | } | |
1105 | ||
1106 | /* | |
1107 | * Name checks and usage 0/1 constraint enforcement are delayed until | |
1108 | * X509_verify_cert() builds the full chain and calls our verify_chain() | |
1109 | * wrapper. | |
1110 | */ | |
1111 | dane->verify = X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(ctx); | |
1112 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_chain); | |
1113 | ||
1114 | if (X509_verify_cert(ctx)) | |
1115 | return 1; | |
1116 | ||
1117 | /* | |
1118 | * If the chain is invalid, clear any matching cert or hostname, to | |
1119 | * protect callers that might erroneously rely on these alone without | |
1120 | * checking the validation status. | |
1121 | */ | |
1122 | if (dane->match) | |
1123 | { | |
1124 | X509_free(dane->match); | |
1125 | dane->match = 0; | |
1126 | } | |
1127 | if (dane->mhost) | |
1128 | { | |
1129 | OPENSSL_free(dane->mhost); | |
1130 | dane->mhost = 0; | |
1131 | } | |
1132 | return 0; | |
1133 | } | |
1134 | ||
1135 | static dane_list | |
1136 | list_alloc(size_t vsize) | |
1137 | { | |
1138 | void *value = (void *) OPENSSL_malloc(vsize); | |
1139 | dane_list l; | |
1140 | ||
1141 | if (!value) | |
1142 | { | |
1143 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_LIST_ALLOC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1144 | return 0; | |
1145 | } | |
1146 | if (!(l = (dane_list) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*l)))) | |
1147 | { | |
1148 | OPENSSL_free(value); | |
1149 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_LIST_ALLOC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1150 | return 0; | |
1151 | } | |
1152 | l->next = 0; | |
1153 | l->value = value; | |
1154 | return l; | |
1155 | } | |
1156 | ||
1157 | static void | |
1158 | list_free(void *list, void (*f)(void *)) | |
1159 | { | |
1160 | dane_list head; | |
1161 | dane_list next; | |
1162 | ||
1163 | for (head = (dane_list) list; head; head = next) | |
1164 | { | |
1165 | next = head->next; | |
1166 | if (f && head->value) | |
1167 | f(head->value); | |
1168 | OPENSSL_free(head); | |
1169 | } | |
1170 | } | |
1171 | ||
1172 | static void | |
1173 | ossl_free(void * p) | |
1174 | { | |
1175 | OPENSSL_free(p); | |
1176 | } | |
1177 | ||
1178 | static void | |
1179 | dane_mtype_free(void *p) | |
1180 | { | |
1181 | list_free(((dane_mtype) p)->data, ossl_free); | |
1182 | OPENSSL_free(p); | |
1183 | } | |
1184 | ||
1185 | static void | |
1186 | dane_selector_free(void *p) | |
1187 | { | |
1188 | list_free(((dane_selector) p)->mtype, dane_mtype_free); | |
1189 | OPENSSL_free(p); | |
1190 | } | |
1191 | ||
1192 | ||
1193 | ||
1194 | /* | |
1195 | ||
1196 | Tidy up once the connection is finished with. | |
1197 | ||
1198 | Arguments | |
1199 | ssl The ssl connection handle | |
1200 | ||
1201 | => Before calling SSL_free() | |
1202 | tls_close() and tls_getc() [the error path] are the obvious places. | |
1203 | Could we do it earlier - right after verification? In tls_client_start() | |
1204 | right after SSL_connect() returns, in that case. | |
1205 | ||
1206 | */ | |
1207 | ||
1208 | void | |
1209 | DANESSL_cleanup(SSL *ssl) | |
1210 | { | |
1211 | ssl_dane *dane; | |
1212 | int u; | |
1213 | ||
1214 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane lib-cleanup\n"); | |
1215 | ||
1216 | if (dane_idx < 0 || !(dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx))) | |
1217 | return; | |
1218 | (void) SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx, 0); | |
1219 | ||
1220 | dane_reset(dane); | |
1221 | if (dane->hosts) | |
1222 | list_free(dane->hosts, ossl_free); | |
1223 | for (u = 0; u <= DANESSL_USAGE_LAST; ++u) | |
1224 | if (dane->selectors[u]) | |
1225 | list_free(dane->selectors[u], dane_selector_free); | |
1226 | if (dane->pkeys) | |
1227 | list_free(dane->pkeys, pkey_free); | |
1228 | if (dane->certs) | |
1229 | list_free(dane->certs, cert_free); | |
1230 | OPENSSL_free(dane); | |
1231 | } | |
1232 | ||
1233 | static dane_host_list | |
1234 | host_list_init(const char **src) | |
1235 | { | |
1236 | dane_host_list head = NULL; | |
1237 | ||
1238 | while (*src) | |
1239 | { | |
1240 | dane_host_list elem = (dane_host_list) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*elem)); | |
1241 | if (elem == 0) | |
1242 | { | |
1243 | list_free(head, ossl_free); | |
1244 | return 0; | |
1245 | } | |
1246 | elem->value = OPENSSL_strdup(*src++); | |
1247 | LINSERT(head, elem); | |
1248 | } | |
1249 | return head; | |
1250 | } | |
1251 | ||
1252 | ||
1253 | int | |
1254 | DANESSL_get_match_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 **match, const char **mhost, int *depth) | |
1255 | { | |
1256 | ssl_dane *dane; | |
1257 | ||
1258 | if (dane_idx < 0 || (dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx)) == 0) | |
1259 | { | |
1260 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_INIT); | |
1261 | return -1; | |
1262 | } | |
1263 | ||
1264 | if (dane->match) | |
1265 | { | |
1266 | if (match) | |
1267 | *match = dane->match; | |
1268 | if (mhost) | |
1269 | *mhost = dane->mhost; | |
1270 | if (depth) | |
1271 | *depth = dane->mdpth; | |
1272 | } | |
1273 | ||
1274 | return (dane->match != 0); | |
1275 | } | |
1276 | ||
1277 | ||
1278 | #ifdef never_called | |
1279 | int | |
1280 | DANESSL_verify_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | |
1281 | { | |
1282 | int ret; | |
1283 | X509 *cert; | |
1284 | X509_STORE_CTX * store_ctx; | |
1285 | SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl); | |
1286 | X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ssl_ctx); | |
1287 | int store_ctx_idx = SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(); | |
1288 | ||
1289 | cert = sk_X509_value(chain, 0); | |
1290 | if (!(store_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new())) | |
1291 | { | |
1292 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_DANESSL_VERIFY_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1293 | return 0; | |
1294 | } | |
1295 | if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(store_ctx, store, cert, chain)) | |
1296 | { | |
1297 | X509_STORE_CTX_free(store_ctx); | |
1298 | return 0; | |
1299 | } | |
1300 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(store_ctx, store_ctx_idx, ssl); | |
1301 | ||
1302 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(store_ctx, | |
1303 | SSL_is_server(ssl) ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); | |
1304 | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(store_ctx), | |
1305 | SSL_get0_param(ssl)); | |
1306 | ||
1307 | if (SSL_get_verify_callback(ssl)) | |
1308 | X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(store_ctx, SSL_get_verify_callback(ssl)); | |
1309 | ||
1310 | ret = verify_cert(store_ctx, NULL); | |
1311 | ||
1312 | SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(store_ctx)); | |
1313 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(store_ctx); | |
1314 | ||
1315 | return (ret); | |
1316 | } | |
1317 | #endif | |
1318 | ||
1319 | ||
1320 | ||
1321 | ||
1322 | /* | |
1323 | ||
1324 | Call this for each TLSA record found for the target, after the | |
1325 | DANE setup has been done on the ssl connection handle. | |
1326 | ||
1327 | Arguments: | |
1328 | ssl Connection handle | |
1329 | usage TLSA record field | |
1330 | selector TLSA record field | |
1331 | mdname ??? message digest name? | |
1332 | data ??? TLSA record megalump? | |
1333 | dlen length of data | |
1334 | ||
1335 | Return | |
1336 | -1 on error | |
1337 | 0 action not taken | |
1338 | 1 record accepted | |
1339 | */ | |
1340 | ||
1341 | int | |
1342 | DANESSL_add_tlsa(SSL *ssl, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector, const char *mdname, | |
1343 | unsigned const char *data, size_t dlen) | |
1344 | { | |
1345 | ssl_dane *dane; | |
1346 | dane_selector_list s = 0; | |
1347 | dane_mtype_list m = 0; | |
1348 | dane_data_list d = 0; | |
1349 | dane_cert_list xlist = 0; | |
1350 | dane_pkey_list klist = 0; | |
1351 | const EVP_MD *md = 0; | |
1352 | ||
1353 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane add-tlsa: usage %u sel %u mdname \"%s\"\n", | |
1354 | usage, selector, mdname); | |
1355 | ||
1356 | if(dane_idx < 0 || !(dane = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx))) | |
1357 | { | |
1358 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_INIT); | |
1359 | return -1; | |
1360 | } | |
1361 | ||
1362 | if (usage > DANESSL_USAGE_LAST) | |
1363 | { | |
1364 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_USAGE); | |
1365 | return 0; | |
1366 | } | |
1367 | if (selector > DANESSL_SELECTOR_LAST) | |
1368 | { | |
1369 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_SELECTOR); | |
1370 | return 0; | |
1371 | } | |
1372 | ||
1373 | /* Support built-in standard one-digit mtypes */ | |
1374 | if (mdname && *mdname && mdname[1] == '\0') | |
1375 | switch (*mdname - '0') | |
1376 | { | |
1377 | case DANESSL_MATCHING_FULL: mdname = 0; break; | |
1378 | case DANESSL_MATCHING_2256: mdname = "sha256"; break; | |
1379 | case DANESSL_MATCHING_2512: mdname = "sha512"; break; | |
1380 | } | |
1381 | if (mdname && *mdname && !(md = EVP_get_digestbyname(mdname))) | |
1382 | { | |
1383 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_DIGEST); | |
1384 | return 0; | |
1385 | } | |
1386 | if (mdname && *mdname && dlen != EVP_MD_size(md)) | |
1387 | { | |
1388 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_DATA_LENGTH); | |
1389 | return 0; | |
1390 | } | |
1391 | if (!data) | |
1392 | { | |
1393 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_NULL_DATA); | |
1394 | return 0; | |
1395 | } | |
1396 | ||
1397 | /* | |
1398 | * Full Certificate or Public Key when NULL or empty digest name | |
1399 | */ | |
1400 | if (!mdname || !*mdname) | |
1401 | { | |
1402 | X509 *x = 0; | |
1403 | EVP_PKEY *k = 0; | |
1404 | const unsigned char *p = data; | |
1405 | ||
1406 | #define xklistinit(lvar, ltype, var, freeFunc) do { \ | |
1407 | (lvar) = (ltype) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*(lvar))); \ | |
1408 | if ((lvar) == 0) { \ | |
1409 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); \ | |
1410 | freeFunc((var)); \ | |
1411 | return 0; \ | |
1412 | } \ | |
1413 | (lvar)->next = 0; \ | |
1414 | lvar->value = var; \ | |
1415 | } while (0) | |
1416 | #define xkfreeret(ret) do { \ | |
1417 | if (xlist) list_free(xlist, cert_free); \ | |
1418 | if (klist) list_free(klist, pkey_free); \ | |
1419 | return (ret); \ | |
1420 | } while (0) | |
1421 | ||
1422 | switch (selector) | |
1423 | { | |
1424 | case DANESSL_SELECTOR_CERT: | |
1425 | if (!d2i_X509(&x, &p, dlen) || dlen != p - data) | |
1426 | { | |
1427 | if (x) | |
1428 | X509_free(x); | |
1429 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_CERT); | |
1430 | return 0; | |
1431 | } | |
1432 | k = X509_get_pubkey(x); | |
1433 | EVP_PKEY_free(k); | |
1434 | if (k == 0) | |
1435 | { | |
1436 | X509_free(x); | |
1437 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_CERT_PKEY); | |
1438 | return 0; | |
1439 | } | |
1440 | if (usage == DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA) | |
1441 | xklistinit(xlist, dane_cert_list, x, X509_free); | |
1442 | break; | |
1443 | ||
1444 | case DANESSL_SELECTOR_SPKI: | |
1445 | if (!d2i_PUBKEY(&k, &p, dlen) || dlen != p - data) | |
1446 | { | |
1447 | if (k) | |
1448 | EVP_PKEY_free(k); | |
1449 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_ADD_TLSA, DANESSL_R_BAD_PKEY); | |
1450 | return 0; | |
1451 | } | |
1452 | if (usage == DANESSL_USAGE_DANE_TA) | |
1453 | xklistinit(klist, dane_pkey_list, k, EVP_PKEY_free); | |
1454 | break; | |
1455 | } | |
1456 | } | |
1457 | ||
1458 | /* Find insertion point and don't add duplicate elements. */ | |
1459 | for (s = dane->selectors[usage]; s; s = s->next) | |
1460 | if (s->value->selector == selector) | |
1461 | { | |
1462 | for (m = s->value->mtype; m; m = m->next) | |
1463 | if (m->value->md == md) | |
1464 | { | |
1465 | for (d = m->value->data; d; d = d->next) | |
1466 | if ( d->value->datalen == dlen | |
1467 | && memcmp(d->value->data, data, dlen) == 0) | |
1468 | xkfreeret(1); | |
1469 | break; | |
1470 | } | |
1471 | break; | |
1472 | } | |
1473 | ||
1474 | if ((d = (dane_data_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*d->value) + dlen)) == 0) | |
1475 | xkfreeret(0); | |
1476 | d->value->datalen = dlen; | |
1477 | memcpy(d->value->data, data, dlen); | |
1478 | if (!m) | |
1479 | { | |
1480 | if ((m = (dane_mtype_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*m->value))) == 0) | |
1481 | { | |
1482 | list_free(d, ossl_free); | |
1483 | xkfreeret(0); | |
1484 | } | |
1485 | m->value->data = 0; | |
1486 | if ((m->value->md = md) != 0) | |
1487 | m->value->mdlen = dlen; | |
1488 | if (!s) | |
1489 | { | |
1490 | if ((s = (dane_selector_list) list_alloc(sizeof(*s->value))) == 0) | |
1491 | { | |
1492 | list_free(m, dane_mtype_free); | |
1493 | xkfreeret(0); | |
1494 | } | |
1495 | s->value->mtype = 0; | |
1496 | s->value->selector = selector; | |
1497 | LINSERT(dane->selectors[usage], s); | |
1498 | } | |
1499 | LINSERT(s->value->mtype, m); | |
1500 | } | |
1501 | LINSERT(m->value->data, d); | |
1502 | ||
1503 | if (xlist) | |
1504 | LINSERT(dane->certs, xlist); | |
1505 | else if (klist) | |
1506 | LINSERT(dane->pkeys, klist); | |
1507 | ++dane->count; | |
1508 | return 1; | |
1509 | } | |
1510 | ||
1511 | ||
1512 | ||
1513 | ||
1514 | /* | |
1515 | Call this once we have an ssl connection handle but before | |
1516 | making the TLS connection. | |
1517 | ||
1518 | => In tls_client_start() after the call to SSL_new() | |
1519 | and before the call to SSL_connect(). Exactly where | |
1520 | probably does not matter. | |
1521 | We probably want to keep our existing SNI handling; | |
1522 | call this with NULL. | |
1523 | ||
1524 | Arguments: | |
1525 | ssl Connection handle | |
1526 | sni_domain Optional peer server name | |
1527 | hostnames list of names to chack against peer cert | |
1528 | ||
1529 | Return | |
1530 | -1 on fatal error | |
1531 | 0 nonfatal error | |
1532 | 1 success | |
1533 | */ | |
1534 | ||
1535 | int | |
1536 | DANESSL_init(SSL *ssl, const char *sni_domain, const char **hostnames) | |
1537 | { | |
1538 | ssl_dane *dane; | |
1539 | int i; | |
1540 | ||
1541 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane ssl_init\n"); | |
1542 | if (dane_idx < 0) | |
1543 | { | |
1544 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_INIT, DANESSL_R_LIBRARY_INIT); | |
1545 | return -1; | |
1546 | } | |
1547 | ||
1548 | if (sni_domain && !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ssl, sni_domain)) | |
1549 | return 0; | |
1550 | ||
1551 | if ((dane = (ssl_dane *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(ssl_dane))) == 0) | |
1552 | { | |
1553 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1554 | return 0; | |
1555 | } | |
1556 | if (!SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, dane_idx, dane)) | |
1557 | { | |
1558 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1559 | OPENSSL_free(dane); | |
1560 | return 0; | |
1561 | } | |
1562 | ||
1563 | dane->verify = 0; | |
1564 | dane->hosts = 0; | |
1565 | dane->thost = 0; | |
1566 | dane->pkeys = 0; | |
1567 | dane->certs = 0; | |
1568 | dane->chain = 0; | |
1569 | dane->match = 0; | |
1570 | dane->roots = 0; | |
1571 | dane->depth = -1; | |
1572 | dane->mhost = 0; /* Future SSL control interface */ | |
1573 | dane->mdpth = 0; /* Future SSL control interface */ | |
1574 | dane->multi = 0; /* Future SSL control interface */ | |
1575 | dane->count = 0; | |
1576 | dane->hosts = 0; | |
1577 | ||
1578 | for (i = 0; i <= DANESSL_USAGE_LAST; ++i) | |
1579 | dane->selectors[i] = 0; | |
1580 | ||
1581 | if (hostnames && (dane->hosts = host_list_init(hostnames)) == 0) | |
1582 | { | |
1583 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
1584 | DANESSL_cleanup(ssl); | |
1585 | return 0; | |
1586 | } | |
1587 | ||
1588 | return 1; | |
1589 | } | |
1590 | ||
1591 | ||
1592 | /* | |
1593 | ||
1594 | Call this once we have a context to work with, but | |
1595 | before DANESSL_init() | |
1596 | ||
1597 | => in tls_client_start(), after tls_init() call gives us the ctx, | |
1598 | if we decide we want to (policy) and can (TLSA records available) | |
1599 | replacing (? what about fallback) everything from testing tls_verify_hosts | |
1600 | down to just before calling SSL_new() for the conn handle. | |
1601 | ||
1602 | Arguments | |
1603 | ctx SSL context | |
1604 | ||
1605 | Return | |
1606 | -1 Error | |
1607 | 1 Success | |
1608 | */ | |
1609 | ||
1610 | int | |
1611 | DANESSL_CTX_init(SSL_CTX *ctx) | |
1612 | { | |
1613 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane ctx-init\n"); | |
1614 | if (dane_idx >= 0) | |
1615 | { | |
1616 | SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(ctx, verify_cert, 0); | |
1617 | return 1; | |
1618 | } | |
1619 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_CTX_INIT, DANESSL_R_LIBRARY_INIT); | |
1620 | return -1; | |
1621 | } | |
1622 | ||
1623 | static void | |
1624 | dane_init(void) | |
1625 | { | |
1626 | /* | |
1627 | * Store library id in zeroth function slot, used to locate the library | |
1628 | * name. This must be done before we load the error strings. | |
1629 | */ | |
1630 | err_lib_dane = ERR_get_next_error_library(); | |
1631 | ||
1632 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR | |
1633 | if (err_lib_dane > 0) | |
1634 | { | |
1635 | dane_str_functs[0].error |= ERR_PACK(err_lib_dane, 0, 0); | |
1636 | ERR_load_strings(err_lib_dane, dane_str_functs); | |
1637 | ERR_load_strings(err_lib_dane, dane_str_reasons); | |
1638 | } | |
1639 | #endif | |
1640 | ||
1641 | /* | |
1642 | * Register SHA-2 digests, if implemented and not already registered. | |
1643 | */ | |
1644 | #if defined(LN_sha256) && defined(NID_sha256) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256) | |
1645 | if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha224)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224()); | |
1646 | if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256()); | |
1647 | #endif | |
1648 | #if defined(LN_sha512) && defined(NID_sha512) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA512) | |
1649 | if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha384)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384()); | |
1650 | if (!EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha512)) EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512()); | |
1651 | #endif | |
1652 | ||
1653 | /* | |
1654 | * Register an SSL index for the connection-specific ssl_dane structure. | |
1655 | * Using a separate index makes it possible to add DANE support to | |
1656 | * existing OpenSSL releases that don't have a suitable pointer in the | |
1657 | * SSL structure. | |
1658 | */ | |
1659 | dane_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, 0, 0, 0, 0); | |
1660 | } | |
1661 | ||
1662 | ||
1663 | #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) | |
1664 | static void | |
1665 | run_once(volatile int * once, void (*init)(void)) | |
1666 | { | |
1667 | int wlock = 0; | |
1668 | ||
1669 | CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1670 | if (!*once) | |
1671 | { | |
1672 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1673 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1674 | wlock = 1; | |
1675 | if (!*once) | |
1676 | { | |
1677 | *once = 1; | |
1678 | init(); | |
1679 | } | |
1680 | } | |
1681 | if (wlock) | |
1682 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1683 | else | |
1684 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | |
1685 | } | |
1686 | #endif | |
1687 | ||
1688 | ||
1689 | ||
1690 | /* | |
1691 | ||
1692 | Call this once. Probably early in startup will do; may need | |
1693 | to be after SSL library init. | |
1694 | ||
1695 | => put after call to tls_init() for now | |
1696 | ||
1697 | Return | |
1698 | 1 Success | |
1699 | 0 Fail | |
1700 | */ | |
1701 | ||
1702 | int | |
1703 | DANESSL_library_init(void) | |
1704 | { | |
1705 | static CRYPTO_ONCE once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; | |
1706 | ||
1707 | DEBUG(D_tls) debug_printf("Dane lib-init\n"); | |
1708 | (void) CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once(&once, dane_init); | |
1709 | ||
1710 | #if defined(LN_sha256) | |
1711 | /* No DANE without SHA256 support */ | |
1712 | if (dane_idx >= 0 && EVP_get_digestbyname(LN_sha256) != 0) | |
1713 | return 1; | |
1714 | #endif | |
1715 | DANEerr(DANESSL_F_LIBRARY_INIT, DANESSL_R_SUPPORT); | |
1716 | return 0; | |
1717 | } | |
1718 | ||
1719 | ||
1720 | /* vi: aw ai sw=2 | |
1721 | */ |